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ABSTRACT
Pricing is essential for the commercial success of spatial crowd-
sourcing applications. The spatial crowdsourcing platform prices
tasks according to the demand and the supply in the crowdsourcing
market to maximize its total revenue. Traditional pricing strategies
seek a unified optimal price for a single global market. Yet spatial
crowdsourcing needs to dynamically price for multiple local mar-
kets fragmented by the spatiotemporal distributions of tasks and
workers and the mobility of workers. Dynamic pricing in spatial
crowdsourcing is challenging because the supply in local markets
can be limited and dependent, leading to global dependencies when
pricing tasks in each local market. To this end, we define the Global
Dynamic Pricing (GDP) problem in spatial crowdsourcing. We fur-
ther propose a MAtching-based Pricing Strategy (MAPS) with guar-
anteed bound, which efficiently approximates the expected total
revenue for markets with limited supply, effectively distributes the
dependent supply and dynamically prices the tasks. Extensive eval-
uations on both synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate the
effectiveness and efficiency of MAPS.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→ Spatial-temporal systems;
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1 INTRODUCTION
The development of mobile Internet and sharing economy brings
the prosperity of spatial crowdsourcing. Nowadays, spatial crowd-
sourcing applications are ubiquitous: intelligent transportation (e.g.,
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Uber [3] and DiDi [5]), food delivery (e.g., Seamless [1]), informa-
tion collection (e.g., Waze [6] and OSM [2]) and micro-tasks (e.g.,
Gigwalk [4] and gMission [16]). These platforms provide a new
way of organizing the crowd to complete spatial tasks.
Pricing the spatial tasks is one crucial step in the management
and operation of spatial crowdsourcing. The typical pricing pro-
cess in spatial crowdsourcing works as follows. First, requesters
submit tasks to the crowdsourcing platform. Each task requires a
crowd worker to travel a distance from his/her origin to a specific
destination [15, 40]. Then the platform decides the price per unit
distance for the tasks and reveals the prices to the requesters. After
observing the unit price, the requesters decide whether to accept it
or not, according to their expectations on the unit price. After re-
ceiving the requesters’ decisions, the platform assigns workers for
those requesters who accept the unit price, and gets a correspond-
ing revenue. Proper unit prices are vital for the total revenue of
the platform, because (i) low unit price may yield low total revenue
when the number of workers is limited; (ii) high unit price may
threaten requesters away, which also decreases the total revenue.
Yet pricing tasks in spatial crowdsourcing is non-trivial. Unlike
traditional crowdsourcing where each worker can potentially per-
form all tasks posted on the platform [17, 25, 30, 31], workers in
spatial crowdsourcing can only serve a portion of spatial tasks, since
some tasks require a traveling distance beyond the capability of
workers [15, 40]. Consequently, the unified market in traditional
crowdsourcing tends to fragment into multiple local markets in spa-
tial crowdsourcing. As a result of the spatiotemporal distributions
of workers and tasks, each local market often varies in supply and
demand, posing a need for dynamic pricing for each local market.
Despite existing research on pricing in crowdsourcing [36, 37], dy-
namic pricing in spatial crowdsourcing is largely unexplored due
to the following three challenges.
Unknown Demand. Only the requesters who accept the price will
contribute to the total revenue of the crowdsourcing platform. But
the decisions of requesters are unknown before the platform decides
the unit prices. A common approach is to estimate the expectation
of requesters on the unit prices. Thus the first question for pricing
in spatial crowdsourcing is: How to estimate the expectations of
requesters on different prices ( i.e., how much they are willing to pay)?
Limited Supply. Unlike traditional crowdsourcing where work-
ers are sufficient, spatial crowdsourcing applications can face a
shortage of workers. For instance, near the stadium after a football
match, there are usually insufficient taxis to drive people home, and
passengers are willing to pay a higher price due to the imbalanced
demand and supply. The variety of demand and supply across local
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Figure 1: An illustration of the running example.
Table 1: Acceptance ratios for Example 1.
p 1 2 3
S(p) 0.9 0.8 0.5
markets poses a question: How to formulate a pricing framework to
meet the diverse demand-supply conditions in multiple local markets?
Dependent Supply. Workers in real-world spatial crowdsourcing
applications can be dependent. For example, a taxi may be able to
pick up passengers living in multiple districts. But once it picks a
passenger, it cannot serve other passengers, leading to a reduce in
supply in the rest of the districts (local markets). As the platform
aims to maximize the total revenue among all local markets, the
dependency among local markets raises an additional question.
How to distribute the supply in multiple dependent local markets such
that the unit prices in each local market maximize the total revenue?
We illustrate the unique challenges of pricing in spatial crowd-
sourcing via the following example.
Example 1. Imagine a taxi-calling platform and assume 3 tasks
(r1 − r3) and 3 workers (w1 −w3) appear on the platform. The origins
of the tasks and the locations of the workers are shown in Fig. 1a. To
finish r1, r2 and r3, a worker needs to travel from the task’s origin to
destination with a distance of 1.3, 0.7, and 1, respectively. The platform
will offer a unit price for each task, and the tasks whose requesters
accept the offered price will be served. Table 1 shows the probabilities
of a requester to accept a given price. Note that Table 1 needs to
be estimated in practice. If every worker can perform all the tasks,
according to Table 1, a unit price of 2 will maximize the expected
total revenue of the platform. In reality, workers can only move in a
finite speed, imposing a range constraint on the tasks a worker can
serve. We assume all workers have the same range constraint, which
is a circle of a radius of 2.5. Based on the range constraint, we can
construct a bipartite graph (Fig. 1b), to reflect the spatial distributions
of tasks and workers. From Fig. 1b, at most two tasks can be served
and at most one of r1 and r2 can be served. We can set the unit price of
3 to r1 and r2 , because the possibility of both r1 and r2 reject the price
is low. And r3 is assured to be served as long as the offered price is
accepted, so we can offer the unit price of 2 to r3, which can maximize
the expected revenue contributed by r3. We will see later that unit
prices of 3, 3, 2 for r1, r2 and r3 is optimal in this example. To get
such an optimization, we need to estimate the acceptance ratios of
requesters, and consider the spatial distribution of tasks and works,
which indicates limited and dependent supply in the region.
Contributions and Roadmap.Motivated by the above exam-
ple, we propose the Global Dynamic Pricing (GDP) problem in spa-
tial crowdsourcing (Sec. 2). It stems from real-world spatial crowd-
sourcing applications and aims to deal with dynamic pricing in
multiple local markets with (i) unknown demand, (ii) limited supply
and (iii) dependent supply. To solve the GDP problem, we first pro-
pose a base pricing strategy with guarantees to set a unified base
price for all local markets with unknown demand (Sec. 3). Taking
the base price as input, we design MAtching-based Pricing Strategy
(MAPS), which (i) promptly learns the demand (probabilities to
accept a given price), (ii) efficiently approximates the expected rev-
enue with both sufficient and limited supply, and (iii) incrementally
optimizes the dependent supply (Sec. 4). We verify the effectiveness
and efficiency of the proposed pricing strategies on large-scale syn-
thetic and real-world datasets (Sec. 5). Finally, we review previous
works and conclude this paper (Sec. 6 and Sec. 7).
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section introduces the important notations and defines the
global dynamic pricing (GDP) problem in spatial crowdsourcing. All
proofs involved in this paper are presented in the appendix.
2.1 Preliminaries
We assume the region of interest is partitioned in space as grids.
Definition 1 (Grid). The entire spatial region of interest is parti-
tioned into grid cells, indexed by 1, . . . ,G.
Spatiotemporal information is a central factor for pricing in
spatial crowdsourcing. Platforms tend to set a single unit price (i.e.,
price per unit distance) for the tasks in the same grid and the same
time period, due to lack of additional data for personalized pricing.
Note that the concrete space partitioning scheme is application-
specific, and we adopt grid indices for simplicity.
Example 2. We use grids with the side of length 2 and index from
the bottom-left to partition the region in Example 1.w3 is in grid 7.
r1 and r2 are in grid 9.
Definition 2 (Spatial Task). A spatial task (“task” for short),
denoted by r =< t ,orir ,desr >, is issued by a requester
1 in a time
period t . Each requester has a private valuation vr representing the
maximum unit price he/she is willing to accept.
1In the rest of the paper, we also use r to denote the requester who issues the task r .
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If a requester accepts the unit price set by the platform, he/she
will be assigned a worker to complete his/her task. To complete the
task, the worker travels from orir to desr with a total distance dr
(e.g., Euclidean or road-network distance). And the platform gets a
revenue equal to dr times the offered unit price.
Private valuations vr are unknown to the platform. We assume
that the private valuations in the same grid д are i.i.d. samples from
an unknown distribution in a given time period [9, 10, 22, 34, 37].
For any requester in a grid д, the cumulative distribution function
(“CDF” for short) of his/her vr is defined by F
д(p) = Pr[vr ≤ p].
We further define the acceptance ratio of requesters.
Definition 3 (Acceptance Ratio of Reqesters). For any
requester in a grid д and a given unit price p, his/her acceptance ratio
w.r.t. p is defined by Sд(p) = Pr[vr > p] = 1 − Fд(p).
Note that the acceptance radio is a generic indicator of the price
level in the spatial crowdsourcingmarket. According to the efficient-
market hypothesis (EMH) [24], the acceptance ratios have implicitly
accounted for all available information such as time, routes, traffic
conditions, weather, etc.
Definition 4 (Crowd Worker). A crowd worker, denoted by
w =< t , lw ,aw >, is available on the platform from time period t at
an initial location lw . A workerw can complete any task r only if r ’s
origin orir is located within the circle centered at lw with the radius
aw (known as the range constraint).
Thiswork only considers workers without a constraint on his/her
final destination. Studies have shown that most workers in crowd-
sourcing platforms tend to performmultiple tasks for a long time [33],
e.g., full-time taxi drivers. Workers who only perform tasks at their
convenience (e.g., temporary Uber drivers who take passengers on
their way home) are beyond the scope.
2.2 Problem Definition
As stated in Sec. 1, the platform sets the unit prices for spatial tasks
to maximize its potential total revenue. The total revenue is affected
by (i) the tasks that accept the unit prices and (ii) the spatiotemporal
relationships between tasks and workers. We define total revenue
leveraging a probabilistic bipartite graph, which represents both
the probabilistic acceptance of tasks (modeled by acceptance ratios
in Definition 3), as well as the spatial constraints between tasks
and workers (each worker may serve multiple grids but can only
perform one task at a time).
We use possible world semantics [19] to identify the probabilistic
bipartite graph, denoted by Bt =< Rt ,W t ,Et , S >, with the dis-
tribution of sampled possible bipartite graphs, where Rt andW t
denote the sets of issued tasks and available workers in time period
t , respectively, and S is the set of acceptance ratios of requesters.
(i) The nodes on the left and right represent the tasks and workers,
respectively. (ii) There is an edge (r ,w) ∈ Et if the task r satisfies
the range constraint of the workerw . (iii) The weight of an edge
(r ,w) is dr × pr where pr is a specific unit price of r , and dr is the
distance from the origin orir to the destination desr . At the end
of t , a bipartite graph Bt =< R′t ,W ′t ,E ′t >, which is an instan-
tiation of the probabilistic bipartite graph Bt , can be constructed.
Specifically, R′t ⊆ Rt are the tasks that accept the unit price, i.e.,
nodes on the left in Bt with pr ≤ vr .W ′t is the same asW t . E ′t is
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Figure 2: Possible bipartite graphs for Fig. 1b.
the edge set of the subgraph based on R′t andW ′t . We then define
the total revenue of all grids for time period t .
Definition 5 (Total Revenue). At the end of a time period t ,
given a set of issued tasks Rt , a set of available workersW t , and the
corresponding prices for the tasks, an instantiated bipartite graph
Bt =< R′t ,W ′t ,E ′t > can be constructed, and the total revenue
U (Bt ) = ∑r ∈R′t ,w ∈W ′t ,(r,w )∈M dr × pr , where M is the maximum
weighted bipartite matching in Bt .
There can be 2 |Rt | possible bipartite graphs (and thus 2 |Rt | rev-
enues). Denote the i-th possible bipartite graph by PWBi . In PWBi ,
we use Rt
PW Bi
as the set of tasks that accept the unit price pr and
thus Rt \Rt
PW Bi
is the set of the tasks that reject the unit price.
Since the private valuations of requestersvr within the same grid д
and time period are assumed to be i.i.d., thus the acceptance ratios
of all requesters in a grid are the same probability Sд(pr ). Then we
can define the sampling probability of PWBi :
Pr[PW Bi ] =
∏
r ∈Rt
PW Bi
Sд (pr )
∏
r ∈Rt \Rt
PW Bi
(1 − Sд (pr )),
where the first continued product is the probability of requesters
accepting the unit prices and the second continued product means
the probability of requesters rejecting the unit prices. We use
PWBi  Bt to represent that PWBi is sampled from Bt .
Now we define the expected total revenue for the platform.
Definition 6 (Expected Total Revenue). For a time period t ,
given a set of issued tasks Rt , a set of available workersW t , a multiset
of unit prices P t for each r , and a set of acceptance ratios w.r.t P t for
|Rt | unit prices, the expected total revenue is
E[U (Bt ) |P t ] =
∑
PW BiBt
U (PW Bi ) Pr[PW Bi ]
whereU (PWBi ) is the total revenue of the i-th bipartite graph.
Example 3. Back to our Example 1, for each task/requester, we
assume that the acceptance ratios are the same as in Table 1. The
specific prices of the three tasks r1, r2, r3 are 3, 3, 2, respectively. All
possible bipartite graphs of Fig. 1b are shown in Fig. 2, where each
possible bipartite graph is sampled with probability Pr[PWBi ]. For
example, the sampling probability of the second possible bipartite
graph is calculated by S(3)× (1−S(3))× (1−S(2)) = 0.5×(1− 0.5)×
(1 − 0.8) = 0.05. For each possible bipartite graph, the maximum
weighted bipartite matching is shown as red lines, andU (PWBi ) is
the corresponding total revenue. Hence, given the unit prices {3, 3, 2},
the expected total revenue of Fig. 1b is 4.1.
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Table 2: Summary of major notations.
Notation Description
W t ,Rt The set of workers and requesters
G The number of grids
vr The evaluation of requester r
dr The travel distance of request r
aw The radius of the acceptance range of workerw
Fд (p),Sд (p) The CDF of vr and the acceptance ratio of requester r
Bt The bipartite graph between workers and requesters
Et The edge set in the bipartite graph
U t The total revenue in time period t
In real-world spatial crowdsourcing applications, the platform
does not know the acceptance ratios of requesters in advance. The
acceptance ratios of requesters are hidden variables to be estimated.
And the platform always hopes to find a set of globally optimal
prices to maximize its expected total revenue. The goal stated above
can be formalized to the following problem.
Definition 7 (GDP Problem). For a time period t , given a set
of tasks Rt without knowing their acceptance ratios, a set of workers
W t , the GDP problem is to find a multiset of unit prices P t for each r
such that the expected total revenue E[U (Bt )|P t ] is maximized.
Theorem 1. The GDP problem is NP-hard.
Table 2 lists the major notations used throughout the paper.
3 BASE PRICING
In this section we present base pricing, a baseline pricing strategy
that efficiently estimates the unknown demand (i.e., acceptance
ratios of requesters), and sets the same unit price for all the grids,
a.k.a. base price. A unified base price is reasonable when the supply
is sufficient, i.e., after each requester accepts the price, there is
always an available worker to serve it. It reflects the long-term
unit price, which is a conservative option when the platform has
no prior knowledge of the market. It can also serve as the initial
inputs for dynamic pricing, which we will elaborate on in Sec. 4.
3.1 Basic Idea
Base pricing first estimates the optimal unit prices that maximize
the expected total revenue in each grid and then takes the average
of these unit prices as the base price. When there is sufficient supply
for the tasks in a grid, the optimal price that maximizes the expected
total revenue in the grid is related to the Myerson reserve price [34],
which we explain as follows.
3.1.1 Optimal Price for Each Grid and Myerson Reserve Price.
For a given unit price p, a requester r in grid д will accept p with
the probability Sд(p) = Pr[vr > p] = 1 − Fд(p). If there is always
a worker who can finish r (i.e., sufficient supply), the expected
revenue of r can be expressed as drpS
д(p) (where orir locates in
grid д). Thus the expected total revenue of the requests in grid д
can be expressed as
∑
r drpS
д(p) = pSд(p) · ∑r dr . And we only
need to find the price (i.e., p
д
m ) which maximizes pS
д(p) because it
will also maximize the expected total revenue in grid д.
Further assume the demand distribution Fд(p) is Monotone Haz-
ard Rate (MHR) distributions, meaning that Fд(p) is twice differ-
entiable and the hazard rate function F ′д(p)/(1 − Fд(p)) is mono-
tone non-decreasing, where F ′д(p) is the first-order derivative of
the cumulative distribution function of vr . Then the price p
д
m =
argmaxp pS
д(p) is often named as the Myerson reserve price [34],
as shown in Fig. 3a. The function pSд(p) is concave, which can be
??????
????
???????
(a) Revenue curve.
?
??????
???
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(b) Price estimation.
Figure 3: An illustration of base pricing.
deduced by the properties of MHR [9]. There exists a value p
д
m such
that pSд(p)increases when p < pдm and decreases when p > pдm .
Hence the Myerson reserve price p
д
m is the unique maximizer. Note
that the assumption on MHR distributions is mild, because MHR
distributions are common, which include normal, exponential, and
uniform distributions [9, 11].
We next introduce how to estimate p
д
m for each grid.
3.1.2 Estimating Optimal Price for Each Grid. Accurate calcula-
tion of the Myerson reserve price p
д
m for a give grid д relies on the
continuous revenue curve (i.e., pSд(p) given p). Yet it is difficult to
obtain the revenue curve for each grid д. To estimate p
д
m efficiently
and effectively, we choose a candidate set of prices (denoted by
P
д
cand
) to sample the acceptance probability Sд(p) and apply the
best sample price that maximizes pŜд(p) as pдm , where Ŝд(p) is the
sample mean. The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3b.
3.1.3 Determining Base Price. The base pricepb is the arithmetic
mean of the estimated Myerson reserve prices {pдm } of all the grids.
3.2 Algorithm Details
Algorithm 1 shows the procedure of base pricing. We select pmin
and pmax as the bounds of the sample prices, and (1 + α) as the
multiplier between two successive sample prices. The parameters ϵ
and δ control the accuracy of the sampling, which will be discussed
in Sec. 3.3. In line 1, k represents the number of candidates to
estimate the Myerson reserve price. In lines 2-9, we estimate p
д
m for
each grid д from 1 to G. Specifically, in lines 5-6, price p is offered
to h(p) requesters who recently have issued tasks. Then we observe
their decisions of acceptance or rejection to update the acceptance
ratio (the number of accepted requesters over h(p)). In line 7, we
add the current price p and its observed acceptance ratio Ŝд(p) into
the candidate set P
д
cand
. Then we generate the next sample price in
line 8. In line 9, we choose the price which maximizes pŜд(p). Ties
are broken by choosing the smaller price, since it usually represents
a higher acceptance ratio. Finally the base price pb is output as the
arithmetic mean of the estimated {pдm }.
Example 4. Suppose pmin = 1, pmax = 5, α = 0.5, ϵ = 0.2, and
δ = 0.01. Thenk = 4. The sample prices in P
д
cand
are 1, 1.5, 2.25, 3.375.
For some д, we sample price p = 1 for h(p) = 335 times. Suppose when
we offer the price of 1 to 335 requesters, 300 requesters accept the price.
Then Ŝд(1) = 0.9. Further suppose we get all the Ŝд(p) corresponding
to each sample price as 0.9, 0.85, 0.75, 0.4. Thus we set p
д
m = 2.25.
Remarks.We choose successive sample prices based on a multi-
plier (1+α). The performance guarantee of such a sampling scheme
is analyzed in Sec. 3.3. However, other step sizes also apply. If the
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Algorithm 1: Base Pricing
input :pmin ,pmax ,α , ϵ,δ
output :pb
1 k ←  ln(pmax /pmin )
ln(1+α ) 	;
2 for д ← 1, . . . ,G do
3 p ← pmin ,Pдcand ← ∅;
4 while p ≤ pmax do
5 h(p) ← (2p2/ϵ2) ln(2k/δ )	;
6 Use the price p for h(p) times and observe the
acceptance ratio Ŝд(p);
7 P
д
cand
← Pд
cand
∪ {(p, Ŝд(p))};
8 p ← (1 + α)p;
9 p
д
m ← argmax(p, Ŝд (p))∈Pд
cand
pŜд(p);
10 return pb ←
∑
д p
д
m/G
Myerson reserve price p
д
m falls outside of [pmin ,pmax ], the algo-
rithm returns pmin or pmax .
3.3 Algorithm Analysis
To estimate the Myerson reserve price for each grid д efficiently
and effectively, we want to test the sample prices with a small num-
ber (i.e., h(p)) of requesters while Ŝд(p) is approximated with high
probability. The efficiency and effectiveness of our algorithm is
guaranteed by the following theorems. As the theorems are appli-
cable for each grid д, we omit the superscript for ease of notation.
Theorem 2. Let p′ denote the best price among Pcand , i.e., p′ =
argmax(p, Ŝ (p))∈Pcand pS(p). With probability 1 − δ , the base pricing
algorithm finds pm such that pmS(pm ) ≥ p′S(p′) − ϵ .
We need to set ϵ to be small to get p′ in Pcand . Yet an extremely
small ϵ may lead to too many samples. Based on Theorem 2, ϵ can
be set as αpmin minp S(p). This is because the absolute difference
between the pS(p) of two successive prices |pS(p) − (1 + α)pS((1 +
α)p)| is at least αpmin minp S(p), and we find price p such that
pS(p) ≥ p′S(p′) − ϵ , which ensures we find p′.
Whenwe choose successive sample prices based on themultiplier
(1 + α), we have the following theorem that bounds the accuracy
of our estimation compared with the optimal price (i.e., Myerson
reserve price) on the continuous interval.
Theorem 3. Let p∗ denote the optimal price on the continuous in-
terval [pmin ,pmax ]. If α ∈ (0, 1), we havepmS(pm ) ≥ (1−α)p∗S(p∗).
Finally, we show the approximation guarantee when using a
single base price pb for all grids.
Theorem 4. Let ALG represent the expected revenue achieved by
using the base price pb for all grids. LetOPT represent the maximum
expected total revenue obtained by setting p∗tд for time period t and
each grid д. Assume Gpmin ≥ pmax . Then ALG ≥ 1eGOPT .
Complexity Analysis. It takes O(|Pcand |) time to decide the
price for each grid. Thus the time cost of base pricing isO(G |Pcand |).
Taking the base price as initial inputs, we further propose a
dynamic pricing strategy, which addresses changes from not only
unknown demand, but also limited and dependent supply.
? ? ?
??????? ??????? ???????
Figure 4: Expected revenue with limited supply.
4 DYNAMIC PRICING
The aim of dynamic pricing is to increase the profit by setting
diversified prices for each grid based on the base price. In spatial
crowdsourcing, each grid can be regarded as a local market where
the demand (tasks) and the supply (workers) differ across grids. The
supply of multiple grids can be dependent because (i) each worker
can serve multiple grids yet (ii) each worker can only perform one
task at a time. In this section, we present MAPS, a matching-based
pricing strategy for spatial crowdsourcing to deal with the variety
of supply-demand and the dependency of supply among grids. We
elaborate on the basic idea, algorithm details and performance
guarantee of MAPS in sequel.
4.1 Basic Idea
Unlike base pricing, which assumes sufficient supply, MAPS sets
the optimal prices for grids with both sufficient and limited supply.
Inspired by works in the economy [9, 22], we propose an efficient
approximation of the expected revenue for grids with both sufficient
and limited supply (Sec. 4). Based on the approximation, MAPS
needs to estimate the unknown demand (i.e., acceptance ratio of
requesters) and determine supply to set the unit price for each
grid that maximizes the expected revenue. MAPS adopts an upper
confidence bound technique (UCB) [8] to boost the estimation of
acceptance ratios (Sec. 4.2.2). Since the supply of multiple grids is
dependent, MAPS incrementally optimizes the dependent supply
in each grid and sets the prices efficiently to maximize the expected
total revenue of all grids (Sec. 4.2.3).
4.2 Algorithm Details
We first present the approximation of expected revenue and the
pricing framework for limited supply. Then we detail the MAPS
scheme to estimate the demand and optimize the supply, respec-
tively, which finally decides the unit price for tasks in each grid.
4.2.1 Pricing with Limited Supply. The base pricing strategy in
Sec. 3 assumes sufficient supply, i.e., after each requester accepts the
price, there is always an available worker to perform the task. Yet
it is common that the supply in certain grids is limited, e.g., during
rush hours at transportation hubs. We need an approximation of
the expected revenue applicable to all supply situations.
In MAPS, we approximate the expected revenue using a demand
curve and a supply curve with the price ptд as the variable. The
demand curve is determined by
∑
r ∈Rtд drptдSд(ptд), where Rtд
and Sд(ptд) denote the set of taskswith their origins located inд and
the acceptance ratio w.r.t. price ptд , respectively. Without loss of
generality, we assume the distances of tasks dr1 ≥ dr2 ≥ . . .dr |Rtд | .
The supply curve is calculated as
∑ntд
i=1 drip
tд , i.e., the sum of the
top ntд revenue drip
tд , where ntд is the number of supply in grid д
that we need to specify. The demand curve can be considered as the
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expected revenue under the condition that the supply is sufficient.
The supply curve represents the revenue that ntд workers can yield
at most. Given the demand and the supply curves, the expected
revenue in time period t and grid д can be approximated as
Lд (ntд, ptд ) = min(
∑
r ∈Rtд
drp
tдSд (ptд ),
ntд∑
i=1
dri p
tд ). (1)
The formal mathematical explanation of the approximation will
be presented in the proof of Theorem 10.
Based on such an approximation, there can be three cases to
derive the best unit prices, as illustrated in Fig. 4. In the first case,
the supply curve has a large slope (i.e., large amounts of workers
specified to serve tasks in grid д), indicating sufficient supply. This
is the case in Sec. 3 and the Myerson reserve price is the maximizer.
In the second and the third cases, there is limited supply (i.e., ntд <
|Rtд |). With a low unit price, there will be a shortage in supply.
With a high unit price, requesters tend to reject the price, but the
supply becomes sufficient. The second and the third cases differ in
the price which maximizes Lд(ntд ,ptд). Specifically, the Myerson
reserve price is still the maximizer in the second case, while the
price of the intersection applies in the third one. Note that these
maximizers can be derived only when ntд is specified.
Summary. Approximating the expected revenue in a grid using
the demand and the supply curves reduces the overhead of search-
ing for the optimal price (i.e., enumerating all the possible bipartite
graphs). Next we elaborate on how to estimate the demand curve
and adjust the supply curve such that the approximate expected
revenue of all grids
∑
д L
д(ntд ,ptд) is maximized.
4.2.2 Boosting Acceptance Ratio Estimation. One prerequisite
to set the price for each grid to maximize
∑
д L
д(ntд ,ptд) is to es-
timate the acceptance ratio Sд(p) in each grid д. In base pricing
(Sec. 3), a sampling strategy is applied. In MAPS, we boost the es-
timation of the acceptance ratios via the upper confidence bound
(UCB) [8], a technique for the multi-arm bandit (MAB) problem.
UCB combines exploration (passively acquiring new information
about Sд(p)) and exploitation (actively filtering prices ptд that are
unlikely to maximize the expected revenue given the current sup-
ply). Compared with the sampling process in base pricing, UCB
adopts a different score function to choose the appropriate price,
which only relies on a rough estimate of the acceptance ratios. It
needs fewer samples to decide the best unit price for a grid and is
more suitable when the acceptance ratios need frequent updating.
Mathematically, UCB is defined as the sample mean (for some
probability) plus a confidence radius. In our context, instead of
using the true acceptance ratio Sд(p), we use Ŝ(p) +
√
2 lnN
N (p) when
setting a price given specific supply in a grid. As UCB is identical
for each д, we omit the superscript. Ŝ(p) is the sample mean. N is
the number of requesters in д so far. N (p) is the number of times
we have used p in д. The radius
√
2 lnN
N (p) is zero when N (p) is zero.
As in base pricing, we still choose a price from a candidate set.
Based on the UCB defined above, we set a numerical score (index)
for each price and will choose the price with the largest index. The
index, denoted by I˜ (p), is min(pŜ(p) + p
√
2 lnN
N (p) ,
∑ntд
i=1 dri p∑
r ∈Rtд dr
). It is
designed such that after testing necessary number of requesters, we
always find the price that maximizes Lд(ptд) w.r.t. the current ntд
and the true probability Sд(p) among all the candidate prices. We
analyze the performance guarantee of the UCB-based acceptance
ratio estimation in Sec. 4.3.1.
Note that the acceptance ratio of a grid may change over time
and we need to notify this change. MAPS determines the change
in the acceptance ratio Sд(p) via the statistically-significant devi-
ations [26]. Specifically, for some price, the number of accepted
requesters in д follow the binomial distribution with the probability
of Sд(p) for each tested price. If there is no change in Sд(p), the
binomial random variable takes value around the expected value
with high probability as long as there are enough samples. Thus
we flag a change if the number of accepted requesters is not within
mŜд(p)± 2
√
mŜд(p)(1 − Ŝд(p)) form requesters, where Ŝд(p) is the
acceptance ratio for the previousm requesters.
Summary. By replacing the estimation of the true acceptance
ratio Sд(p) with the UCB-based learning process, MAPS is able to
get the optimal price given a specific supply accurately with a small
number of sampling prices. The UCB-based strategy will be utilized
as a building block to derive the maximum expected revenue of
each grid given the supply (known) and the demand (unknown) of
all grids, as will be detailed in Algorithm 3.
4.2.3 Optimizing Dependent Supply and Dynamic Pricing. Our
goal is to maximize the approximate expected revenue of all grids∑
д L
д(ntд ,ptд), yet the supply in multiple grids can be dependent.
Therefore, we propose to jointly adjust the slopes of the supply
curves (see Fig. 4) for all grids to decide the appropriatentд and thus
the corresponding ptд that maximizes
∑
д L
д(ntд ,ptд). Note that
given a specific ntд , there exists a unique ptд maximizing Lд(ptд),
which will be found using the technique in Sec. 4.2.2. Eq. (1) can
be rewritten as
∑
д L
д(ntд). MAPS optimizes the dependent supply
by first maintaining a bipartite graph which represents the range
constraints and the dependency of supply, incrementally finding
a worker that most increases
∑
д L
д(ntд) without violating the
bipartite graph, and deriving the corresponding price ptд using the
UCB techniques introduced in Sec. 4.2.2.
We initialize the number of supply in each grid ntд as 0. In each
iteration, we try to add one worker to each grid. If the addition
for some д can be made, it corresponds to a match in the bipartite
graph. We choose the match that introduces the largest increase
in
∑
д L
д(ntд) among all the grids. That is, each grid reports its
increase if its ntд can be added by 1, then we choose the grid with
the largest increase, and truly add the corresponding ntд by 1.
Another viewpoint is that for each д, we have the demand curve
(i.e., the first term in Eq. (1)), and we adjust the slope of the supply
curve (i.e., the second term in Eq. (1)), and calculate the increase in
the expected total revenue. The increase in expected revenue for
each д is the maximum value based on the new supply curve minus
the one based on the old supply curve, which is the x-axis at first.
The new slope of the supply curve is the sum of the top ntд + 1
distances and the old one is the sum of the top ntд distances. At
last, we will choose the grid with the largest increase to add one
worker. Note that when the increase of some grid д becomes zero,
we ignore д in the next iteration, because the slope can only be
larger and the maximum will not change.
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Algorithm 2:MAPS
input :Rt ,W t ,pmin ,pmax ,pb
output :P t
1 Construct the bipartite graph B(Rt ,W t );
2 Pre-matchingM ′ ← ∅, Max-heap H ← ∅;
3 for д ← 1, . . . ,G do
4 ntд ← 0 and insert ((д, 0,pb ),∞) into H ;
5 while H is not empty do
6 ((д,ntдnew ,ptдnew ),Δд) ← the root of H ;
7 remove the root from H ;
8 if Δд is not equal to ∞ then
9 ntд ← ntдnew ;
10 Find an augmenting path for r ∈ Rtд and add the
match intoM ′;
11 if Δд is equal to 0 then
12 ptд ← ptдnew ;
13 if ptд > pmax then
14 ptд ← pmax ;
15 else
16 if |Rtд | is equal to 0 or there is not an augmenting path
for any unassigned r ∈ Rtд then
17 insert ((д,ntдnew ,ptдnew ), 0) into H ;
18 else
19 n
tд
new ← ntдnew + 1;
20 calculate the p
tд
new and the new Δ
д using
Algorithm 3;
21 insert ((д,ntдnew ,ptдnew ),Δд) into H ;
22 return P t ← {pt1, . . . ,ptG }
Algorithm 2 illustrates the main procedure. We use the base
price pb calculated by Algorithm 1 as the input. In line 1, we con-
struct the bipartite graph according to the sets of tasks and workers
by satisfying the range constraint. In line 2, we initialize the pre-
matchingM ′, which is used when we test if a new worker can be
assigned to a task of each д (i.e., the supply of д). The max-heap
consists of tuples, each with a triple (д,ntдnew ,ptдnew ). The second
term records the new number of supply for д, and the third term
is the corresponding price. We use Δд to denote the key value of
the tripe, which represents the increase in Lд(ntд). The max-heap
can output the tuple (д,ntдnew ,ptдnew )with the largest Δд in O(loдG)
time. In all but the iteration we finally set the price for each grid, the
number of elements in H is always G. In line 4, we insert the tuple
of each grid into the heap. Their keys are set to positive infinity
so that we can update the key in the first G iterations. In lines 6-7,
we take and remove the tuple with the largest Δд . Line 8 is used to
avoid that the initialization of line 4 (where Δд is set to∞) directly
finds a match in the first G iterations. This case should be avoided
because we have not updated the key using the true increase. In
lines 9-10, given the grid д with the largest Δд , we admit this match
and update the pre-matchingM ′. In line 11, if the largest Δд among
all the grids is zero, we then set the final price for each grid д in
Algorithm 3: Calculating the Maximizer
input :д,Rtд ,ntд , P ,pmax ,pmin ,α
output :pnew ,Δ
д
1 C ← ∑r ∈Rtд drptд ,D ← ∑ntдi=1 driptд ,N ← 0, I˜new ←
0,p ← pmax ;
2 foreach (p, Ŝ(p),N (p)) ∈ P do
3 N ← N + N (p);
4 while p ≥ pmin do
5 c(p) ← p
√
2 lnN
N (p) ;
6 if I˜new < min(pŜ(p) + c(p), DC p)) then
7 I˜new ← min(pŜ(p) + c(p), DC p);
8 pnew ← p;
9 p ← p/(1 + α);
10 return pnew ,Δ
д ← pnew Ŝ(pnew ) − pold Ŝ(pold )
line 12 or line 14 without inserting any new tuple into H . In lines
16-21, we try to add a new worker to grid д and calculate their
increases in Lд , i.e., Δд . Specifically in lines 16-17, if we cannot
assign a task r in grid д to this worker, we set the increase to zero.
Otherwise in lines 19-21, we get the maximum increase Δд and the
corresponding new price p
tд
new using Algorithm 3, and insert the
tuple for further comparisons. Note that when calling Algorithm 3,
the latest statistics stored in P is used to set an optimal price. So
the algorithm does not need to contact new requesters and wait
for their responses. Algorithm 3 illustrates the procedure to calcu-
late the maximizer discussed in Sec. 4.2.2. All the statistics of д are
stored in P . We update Ŝ(p) and N (p) when receiving feedbacks of
the current prices (which are set in lines 12-14 of Algorithm 2). In
lines 2-3, we restore the number of requests shown so far in д. In
lines 5-9, we iterate prices from big to small and choose the price
with the maximum index (defined in Sec. 4.2.2).
Example 5. Back to our running example in Example 1. For sim-
plicity, we assume we have obtained the statistics about the acceptance
ratios as in Table 1. There are 16 grids in Example 1, where r1 and
r2 are in grid 9, and r3 is in grid 11. The bipartite graph is shown
in Fig. 1b. For grid 9,
∑
r ∈Rt9 drpS9(p) is demonstrated by the three
crosses in the first sub-figure in Fig. 5a.
∑
r ∈Rt11 drpS11(p) for grid
11 is shown in the second sub-figure in Fig. 5a. At first, nt9 and nt11
are both 0. Grid 9 reports its increase if nt9 = 1, which is 3. It can
be also viewed as the maximum of the minor one of the line and the
discretized demand curve ( i.e., the three crosses). The increase for grid
11 is 1.6. After the first 16 iterations, H is updated with the increase of
each grid, as shown in the bottom-left in Fig. 5a. The omitted tuples
belong to grids without any task and the increases are set to be 0 in
lines 16-17 of Algorithm 2. Their prices are all set to the base price.
In the 17th iteration, we take the root ((9, 1, 3), 3) from H in line 6 of
Algorithm 2, admit its increase and find an augmenting path for r1
in grid 9 in line 10. M ′ will be updated to {r1,w1}. Since Δд is not
equal to 0, the algorithm goes to line 16. There is no augmenting path
for r2 in grid 9. So we insert ((9, 1, 3), 0) into H . And the dash line for
grid 9 will become solid, meaning we admit that its increase is the
largest one. At the beginning of 18th iteration, as showed in Fig. 5b,
the root of H is ((11, 1, 2), 1.6). We admit its increase and updateM ′
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(b) 18th iteration
Figure 5: An example of dynamic pricing.
accordingly. In the end, all the Δд is zero. We gradually remove tuples
from H in line 7 and price the grids in line 12. The price for grid 9 is 3
and the price for grid 11 is 2, leading to a greater expected revenue.
Summary. MAPS dynamically sets the prices for each grid to
maximize the expected total revenue by incrementally adding work-
ers to the grid that induces the maximum increase in Eq. (1). MAPS
applies concepts of bipartite graph matching to maintain the range
constraints of supply and demand as well as the dependency of sup-
ply. Together with the approximation of the expected revenue and
the UCB-based acceptance ratio learning procedure, MAPS is able
to approach the optimal prices (i) without the need to enumerating
all possible worlds in an uncertain graph, (ii) without accurately
estimating the acceptance ratio beforehand and (iii) with consider-
ations for both sufficient and limited supply.
We also make two practical notes. (i) MAPS tends to set a higher
unit price for regions where workers are insufficient. This will
motivate more drivers to move to these regions, as with many
incentive mechanisms. (ii) A cap on the unit prices can be setting
bounded prices. Spatial smoothing can also be integrated to reduce
the gap of unit prices among neighbouring grids.
4.3 Algorithm Analysis
4.3.1 Analysis of UCB-based Acceptance Ratio Estimation. UCB
ensures that after a small number of tests, we always choose the
best possible price. Let p∗ denote the optimal price in the con-
tinuous interval [pmin ,pmax ] w.r.t S(p) and the given ntд , i.e.,
p∗ = argmaxp∈[pmin,pmax ] L
д(p). Note that p∗ must be in some
interval with bounds that are two successive prices in the candidate
set. Let p′ and p′′ denote the prices such that p′ ≤ p∗ ≤ p′′. Let p0
denote the larger price where the line and the curve intersect, i.e.,
p0S(p0) = Dp0/C and p0 > 0. If it is the first case (i.e., ntд ≥ |Rtд |)
in Fig. 4, let p0 = 0. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 5. Provided that N (p) > 8p2 lnN(max(p′S (p′),p′′S (p′′))−pS (p))2
for any p > p0 except p
′ and p′′, with probability at least 1−O(N−4),
we choose p′ or p′′.
The requirements forN (p) is inversely proportional to the square
of p’s badness, i.e., max(p′S(p′),p′′S(p′′)) −pS(p). Meanwhile, lnN
term ensures the quick convergence to the best possible choice.
The proof mainly uses two useful properties of the designed
index, concluded with two lemmas below.
Lemma 6. For any p, the probability that pS(p) − c(p) < pŜ(p) <
pS(p) + c(p) is at least 1 − 2N−4.
Lemma 7. If N (p) > 8p2 lnN(max(p′S (p′),p′′S (p′′))−pS (p))2 for any p >
p0 except p
′ and p′′, the probability that pS(p) < pŜ(p) + c(p) <
max(p′S(p′),p′′S(p′′)) is at least 1 − 2N−4.
Table 3: Synthetic datasets.
Factor Setting
|W | 1250, 2500, 5k, 7500, 10k
|R | 5000, 10k, 20k, 30k, 40k
μ for temporal distribution 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9
mean for spatial distribution 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9
μ for demand distribution 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0
σ for demand distribution 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5
T 200, 400, 600, 800, 1000
G 5×5, 10×10, 15×15, 20×20, 25×25
aw 5, 10, 15, 20, 25
Scalability
|W | = |R | = 100k,200k,
300k,400k,500k
Since these inequalities all hold with high probability when the
conditions are satisfied, we may state them as deterministic ones
in the proof.
4.3.2 Analysis of MAPS. We will present bounds on the perfor-
mance of MAPS.
Theorem 8. MAPS always finds a feasible plan n′t and prices p′t
such that
∑
д L
д(n′tд ,p′tд) is at least (1− 1e )maxnt ,pt
∑
д L
д(ntд ,ptд).
We first show Δд is decreasing with respect to д. Then we prove
the submodularity of L, which is redefined on the set of workers.
In each iteration we choose the maximum Δд among all the grids,
and this gives us a near optimal solution.
Lemma 9. For a fixed grid д, its Δд are decreasing each time in-
serted to the heap in the line 21 of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 10. Assume (1−Sд(ptд))∑ntдi=1 driptд = O(dmax√ntд logm),
ALG ≥ (1 − 1e )OPT − O(dmax
√
m logm), where dmax = maxr dr ,
andm = maxд |Rtд |.
The assumption ensures that the distances in each grid do not
vary too much, which often holds in practice. MAPS still functions
without the assumption of i.i.d. private valuations. However, the
performance guarantees might no longer hold. The i.i.d. assumption
is mild because (i) the spatiotemporal factors that determine the pri-
vate valuations in the same grid and time period are similar; and (ii)
each individual requester tends to make decisions independently.
ComplexityAnalysis. Initializing themax-heap costsO(GloдG).
For each iteration in the while loop, we take the root in O(loдG)
and find an augmenting path in O(|Et |), where |Et | denotes the
number of edges in the bipartite graph. There will be at most
min(|Rt |, |W t |) iterations. To calculate the next increase, Algo-
rithm 3 takes O(|Pcand |) time to iterate through the prices. The
total time will be O(GloдG +min(|Rt |, |W t |)(loдG + |Et |)|Pcand |).
5 EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
This section presents the performance of MAPS on both synthetic
and real-world datasets.
5.1 Experiment Setup
Synthetic datasets. Table 3 shows the parameters of the synthetic
datasets. Default settings are marked in bold. All locations are
generated within a square of 100 × 100 in the 2D coordinates. A
time period is 1 minute long. The start times of tasks and workers
are drawn from a normal distribution conditioned on the entire
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Table 4: Real datasets.
Duration |W | |R | T G δw aw
#1 5pm-7pm 28210 113372
120 80 [5,10,15,20,25] 3km
#2 0am-2am 19006 55659
time span of interest, which we call the temporal distribution. We
vary the mean of the temporal distribution from 0.1 to 0.9. In each
time period, the origins of tasks and workers are generated from a
two-dimensional Gaussian distribution, which we call the spatial
distribution. The mean of the spatial distribution is calculated by
multiplying the values in Table 3 with a two-dimensional vector
(100, 100). The destinations of tasks are drawn from a uniform
distribution within the 100 × 100 square. Note that varying the
mean and the variance of the temporal and spatial distributions has
similar impact, i.e., affects the structure of bipartite graph. Hence
we omit the experiments on varying the variance of these two
distributions. We simulate the demand distribution via a normal
distribution with its mean varying from 1 to 3. Then the valuations
vr are drawn from each normal distribution w.r.t. the mean of д. We
restrict all the vr to [1, 5], so the distribution of vr is a conditional
probability distribution. We also experiment with other demand
distributions such as an exponential distribution. The results are
similar to those using a normally distributed demand (see Sec. D
for more details). We vary the radius aw of workers from 5 to 25.
We also vary the number of workers |W |, the number of tasks |R |,
the number of time periods T , and the number of grids G.
Real datasets.We use the taxi-calling data sampled from July
2016 to December 2016 in Beijing collected by a large-scale online
taxi-calling platform in China. The data are sampled from two rep-
resentative time of the day, i.e., 5 p.m. to 7 p.m., and 0 a.m. to 2 a.m.,
when there are usually huge demand and light demand of taxis,
respectively. The length of a time period is set to 60 second. We
consider locations within a rectangle with the bottom-left coordi-
nate of (116.30, 39.84) and the top-right coordinate of (116.50, 40.0).
Each grid covers an area of 0.02 longitudes by 0.02 latitudes and
there are 10 × 8 = 80 grids in total. The radius aw for each worker
is 3km. Note that for the real dataset, we cannot obtain the exact
valuations vr . However, the valuation vr should be higher than
the price if the requester accepts the price, and such information
can be obtained from the historical records. So we set vr to be a
random value greater than the set price, and vice versa. Since all
the parameters are fixed, we test the pricing strategies varying the
available duration of each worker.
Compared algorithms.We compare ourMAPS pricing scheme
with the following algorithms.
(1) BaseP. It is the strategy proposed in Sec. 3, which assumes
the unlimited supply and sets the same base price pb for all grids.
(2) SDR. It sets the price for a grid as the inverse of the supply-
demand ration in the grid times a coefficient. We empirically opti-
mize the coefficient on our datasets. SDR sets the price for a given
time period t and a grid д as 0.5pb |Rtд |/|W tд | if |Rtд | > |W tд |,
and the base price pb otherwise.
(3) SDE. It prices tasks via the supply-demand difference in
exponential function. Specifically, SDE sets the price for a given
time period t and a grid д as pb (1+ 2e |W tд |− |Rtд | ) if |Rtд | > |W tд |,
and the base price pb otherwise.
(4) CappedUCB. It is the state-of-the-art pricing strategy pro-
posed by [9] to tackle the problem of limited supply in just one
market. We regard each grid as one single market and indepen-
dently decides the price of each grid. Specifically, the price for
grid д is argmaxpд min(|Rtд |pдSд(pд), |W tд |pд), equivalent to our
Eq. (1) when ntд = |W tд | and each dr = 1.
Metrics and implementation.We assess the performance of
the pricing strategies in terms of the output total revenue, running
time, and memory cost. All the algorithms are implemented in C++
and the experiments are performed with Intel (R) Core (TM) i7
3.80GHz CPU and 4GB main memory.
5.2 Experiment Results
We first present the results on the synthetic dataset with various
parameters, and then show the performance on the real datasets.
Effect of |W |.The first column of Fig. 6 shows the results of
varying the number of workers |W |. As |W | increases from 1250 to
10000, the revenues of all the pricing strategies increase, because
of the increasing amount of the finished requests,i.e., the supply
gradually matches the demand. Among the five strategies, MAPS
yields the highest revenue. Base pricing outperforms the other three
baselines, because it may already ensure the maximum expected
revenue for each task, which is optimal in grids with sufficient
workers. CappedUCB performs badly because it does not consider
the grids globally. As for running time, strategies except MAPS take
constant time. This is because MAPS needs to output a matching
result, and with the increase of |W |, the calculation of the match-
ing takes more time. However, its running time is acceptable, as
the running time spans all the T time periods, and is negligible
compared with the length of a time period. CappedUCB consumes
the most memory and that of other four strategies is similar. The
reason might be that CappedUCB needs to store more information
such as the number of tasks and workers in each grid. The costs of
all the five strategies are less than 10M .
Effect of |R |.The second column of Fig. 6 presents the results
of varying the number of requesters |R |. When |R | increases, all
strategies output a larger revenue, since there are more requests
that can be performed. When |R | is greater than 20000, the growth
stabilizes. This is because the total number of workers is fixed,
and it gradually becomes difficult to increase the revenue. Again
MAPS achieves the highest revenue. MAPS costs the most running
time because of the calculation of the matching result, and takes
acceptable memory consumption. The other four strategies take
constant running time. CappedUCB still costs the most memory.
Effect of μ of the temporal distribution for requests.The
third column of Fig. 6 shows the effect of the mean of the temporal
distribution for requests. The mean for the workers is fixed at
T /2. As the mean for requests approaches 0.5 (i.e., T /2), there is an
increase of the revenues in all the strategies but SDE. This is because
the mean values of tasks and workers gradually become close, and
the tasks and workers overlap more in time. Hence more workers
will satisfy the range constraint, contributing to more edges in
the bipartite graph and thus potentially a larger revenue. MAPS is
still the most effective one among the five pricing strategies. For
running time, when μ approaches 0.5, the time cost of MAPS gets
larger. This is because there are more edges in the bipartite graph.
Yet the time cost is still small when considering the T time periods.
For memory consumption, all consume less than 10M memory, and
CappedUCB consumes the most.
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Figure 6: Results on varying |W |, |R |, μ in temporal distribution, andmean in spatial distribution.
Effect ofmean of the spatial distribution for requests.The
fourth column of Fig. 6 shows the results of varying the mean of
the spatial distribution. The mean of the spatial distribution is two-
dimensional and the x-axis represents the mean on the diagonal.
For example, the value of 0.1 on the x-axis means a vector (10, 10).
Similar to the results when varying the mean of the temporal dis-
tribution, the revenue of all the strategies increases when the mean
of the tasks’ origin is close to that of the workers’ origin. MAPS
yields the largest revenue and costs reasonable time and memory.
Effect of μ of the demand distribution for vr .The first col-
umn of Fig. 7 shows the results with different mean values of the
demand distribution. As the requesters’ valuations increases (i.e.,
they are willing to accept higher prices), the revenue also increases.
For different means of the distribution, MAPS always achieves the
highest revenue, validating the effectiveness of the UCB technique.
MAPS costs more time when μ gets larger, because the acceptance
ratios for some price increase and there is a need to assign more
workers to finish the accepted requests. MAPS is still efficient when
considering the average running time of each time period. For
memory consumption, all strategies cost reasonable memory.
Effect of σ of the demand distribution for vr .The second
column of Fig. 7 presents the results of varying σ of the demand
distribution. Note that the demand distribution is conditioned on
the interval [1, 5]. If the mean of the distribution used to simulate
the normal distribution is fixed at 2 (by default), the actual mean
values are bigger as σ increases. Hence, the revenues of all the
strategies increase. For running time and memory consumption,
their fluctuations are normal and acceptable.
Effect of T . The third column of Fig. 7 shows the result of vary-
ing T . Since all the strategies optimize in each time period, tech-
nically we can observe the best performance if they are all in one
time period. Hence, when the numbers of tasks and workers are
fixed, these numbers in each time period decrease as T increases,
and the revenues of all the strategies slightly decrease because
the optimization becomes weaker. In general, the running time of
MAPS decreases with the increasing ofT . The reason might be that
the numbers of tasks and workers in each time period decrease,
making the calculation of the matching result easier.
Effect of G. The fourth column of Fig. 7 shows the results of
varying the number of grids G. When G increases, each grid be-
comes smaller in size, because the size of the entire region of interest
is fixed. Consequently, we can perform finer-grained optimization.
The revenues first increase with G. G cannot be arbitrarily large,
otherwise the assumption that the valuations in one grid are i.i.d
samples may gradually become invalid, leading to inaccurate esti-
mation of the acceptance ratios. Thus, when G is greater than 100,
the revenues do not increase. When G increases, all strategies con-
sume more memory because they need to store more data. MAPS
performs the best and costs acceptable running time and memory.
Effect of aw .The first column of Fig. 8 shows the results with
different aw , which determines the edge set of the bipartite graph.
More edges result in more total revenue. MAPS is still the best in
terms of revenue. Yet since the means of the spatial distributions
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Figure 7: Results on varying normal μ, normal σ , the number of time periods T , and the number of grids G.
of orir and lw are close to each other, the number of edges may
stop increasing when the radius reaches some value, leading to the
revenues becoming stable when aw is greater than certain value.
With the increase of aw , the time consumption of MAPS grows, as
the bipartite graph has more edges. The memory consumption of
the five strategies fluctuates within an acceptable range.
Scalability.The second column of Fig. 8 plots the results by in-
creasing |R | and |W | simultaneously at the same scale. The running
time of MAPS increases linearly and the other four strategies still
take constant time. Note that we record the total running time of
400 time periods, and the average running time of MAPS in each
time period is actually low. The memory costs of all strategies grow
almost linearly and are acceptable.
Real datasets. The last two columns in Fig. 8 present the per-
formance on the real-world datasets. The duration of workers is
another factor in supply. As workers are available for more time
periods, the quantity of supply increases. As we state in analyz-
ing the results of varying |R |, there exists a limit on the revenue
since the number of tasks is fixed. The revenues of all the strategies
become stable when the duration becomes long. CappedUCB per-
forms better than BaseP in the second dataset. This may be because
the supply is more limited in this dataset, where CappedUCB still
functions, while BaseP does not. MAPS is the best in effectiveness
on both datasets. Similar to the results in the scalability test, all the
strategies prove to be time-efficient and memory-efficient.
Summary of experimental results. (i) MAPS achieves the
largest revenue in both real-world and synthetic datasets. Base
pricing strategy outperforms some heuristics if we choose the base
price appropriately. (ii) All the pricing strategies have acceptable
time and memory costs. (iii) MAPS is scalable in time and space on
the dataset of size of the order 106.
6 RELATEDWORK
6.1 Pricing in Spatial Crowdsourcing
Tasks in spatial crowdsourcing can be processed in a batch at the
end of one time period [20, 21, 27, 39, 44], or be immediately as-
signed [38, 41–43]. We focus on the former mode. Some pioneer
works have considered the effect of prices in spatial applications
[7, 32]. In [7], prices are obtained based on the profiles of work-
ers and requesters, which are used as inputs to find a matching
between workers and requests to maximize the revenue. However,
we aim to optimize the prices to maximize the expected total rev-
enue. In [32], an incentive mechanism in spatial crowdsourcing is
proposed. However, it differs from our work in three-fold: (i) [32] is
designed for crowdsensing, a special case of crowdsourcing, where
a task is to collect data at a location. We focus on the more generic
spatial crowdsourcing applications. (ii) The objective of [32] is to
maximize the data quality, while we aim to maximize the expected
total revenue. (iii) The number of workers in [32] is fixed, while we
optimize the number of workers in each grid.
Dynamic pricing has been recently introduced in some spatial
crowdsourcing companies such as Uber [3]. They prices tasks by
considering the total number of drivers and requesters in a region
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Figure 8: Results on varying the radius of workers aw , scalability test, and real data.
during a time period. However, such a pricing strategy neglects the
fact that a driver may serve requesters in multiple grids. By jointly
optimizing the supply in multiple dependent grids, our solution
tends to set prices that yield a larger expected total revenue.
6.2 Dynamic Price Mechanism Design
Online posted price mechanisms assume there is only one inter-
action between requesters and the platform; the platform declares
its price and the requester decides whether to accept the price or
not. Researchers have proposed competitive pricing strategies with
fixed supply [9, 13, 29], which are inapplicable in our problem.
In the resource allocation markets [23, 28], requesters have pref-
erences for different workers, which can be expressed by a bipartite
graph. The tenet is to find the equilibrium prices or market clearing
prices (i.e., the demand equals supply), which is a different objective.
Our work is also related to revenue maximization in operation
research [12]. Some works [35] assume nonparametric demand
functions such as MHR distributions. Others [9, 22, 37] design tech-
niques such as multi-arm bandit approaches to learn the demand
function with limited supply. Our work adopts the parametric ones,
which admit that the parameters (e.g., the price in our problem) in
the structure of the demand function. However, previous works
only assume a single market with number of supply fixed, while we
consider multiple markets with the number of supply adjustable.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose theGlobal Dynamic Pricing (GDP) problem
for spatial crowdsourcing , which is challenging due to (i) unknown
acceptance probabilities of a given price for each task, (ii) limited
and (iii) dependent supply among multiple grids. To solve the GDP
problem, we first present a base pricing strategy that sets a unified
base price by estimating the acceptance probabilities. We further
develop MAPS, a matching based dynamic pricing strategy that
optimizes the dependent supply and is able to approximately set the
optimal prices for markets with limited supply and unknown accep-
tance probabilities of task requesters. We show through extensive
evaluations that MAPS is both effective and efficient.
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A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. We will use the reduction from the classical 3-SAT prob-
lem to the decision version of GDP problem.
An instance of 3-SAT is a formula in conjunctive normal form
(CNF), containingm clauses and n variables. Each clause has three
literals, either positive or negative. The decision problem is whether
there is an assignment of truth value for each variable such that
the formula is satisfiable. To make a polynomial-time reduction, we
first explain how to map the input of a 3-SAT instance to that of
GDP, and then prove that the 3-SAT problem has a yes answer if
and only if there is a pricing strategy such that the total revenue is
m.
Formally, the formula ϕ = C1∧C2∧ · · · ∧Cm . For each clauseCi ,
there is a workerwi . For each clauseCi = ai ∨bi ∨ ci , there will be
three requests corresponding to the literals. For each positive one,
the requester has the valuation vr = 1 and the distance dr = 1. For
each negative one, the requester has the valuation vr = 2 and the
distance dr = 0.5. Note that now the valuation vr is a deterministic
value (i.e., requester will accept any price which is no more than
vr ) and the revenue has no expectation. It is also easy to see that
when we want to complete some request, pricing at its valuation
will be the best strategy. If ai and ¬ai both appear in the formula,
the requesters representing them will locate in the same region (e.g.,
grid in our problem), which alsomeans that platformsmust offer the
same price to them. The workerwi representing clause Ci locates
in a position such that he/she can only complete the three requests
which represent the literalsCi contains. The transformation can be
done in polynomial time.
Given a satisfiable formula, we will show there is a pricing strat-
egy such that the maximum total revenue ism. For clauseCi , there
is at least one literal which is true. If ai is true, we will price the
requests representing ai and ¬ai 1, and if ¬ai is true, we will price
them both 2 (i.e., same price for the grid contains ai and ¬ai ). This
will ensure that either ai or ¬ai is true, worker for clause Ci can
finish it and gain a revenue of 1 (i.e., 1× 1 when ai is true or 2× 0.5
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when ¬ai is true.). They can not be true at the same time since we
do offer the same price for requests representing ai and ¬ai . Each
worker can finish one request and the maximum total revenue is
m. The converse is also true. Since there arem workers, each must
complete one request with the revenue of 1. If we price the grid
containing ai and ¬ai 1, we will assign true to ai , and if we price it
2, we will assign false to ai . Since each worker can complete one
request, each clause must be true and the formula is satisfiable.

B PROOFS OF BASE PRICING
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We begin with hoeffding inequalities.
Fact 1. (Hoeffding Inequality). Let X1, . . . ,Xn be independent
random variables bounded by [0,1]. Let X¯ =
∑
i Xi/n. Pr[X¯ −E[X¯ ] >
ϵ] = Pr[E[X¯ ] − X¯ > ϵ] ≤ e−2ϵ 2n .
Let xr be the random variable which is 1 if r accepts the price,
and 0 otherwise. When we try price p, xr can be seen as a Bernoulli
random variable, which is 1 with probability S(p) (if p < vr ), and 0
with probability F (p) (if vr ≤ p). Notice that the expected value of
Ŝ(p) is S(p). Using Hoeffding inequality, we sample the price p h(p)
times and obtain
Pr[Ŝ(p) − S(p) > ϵ
2p
] ≤ e−ϵ 2h(p)/2p2 ≤ δ/2k .
. The last inequality is derived by replacingh(p)with (2p2/ϵ2) ln(2k/δ )	.
For any price p ∈ Pcand with pS(p) < p′S(p′) − ϵ , but p chosen
as pm , at least one of the two cases occur: pŜ(p) > pS(p) + ϵ/2 or
p′Ŝ(p′) < p′S(p′) − ϵ/2. Otherwise we could chain the opposites of
the two inequalities and the fact that pŜ(p) > p′Ŝ(p′) (for p chosen
as pm ) to deduce the contradiction. In detail,
pŜ(p) ≤ pS(p) + ϵ/2 ≤ p′S(p′) − ϵ/2 ≤ p′Ŝ(p′).
Due to the union bound, at least one of these two cases happen
with a probability at most δ/k . Still using union bound, the event of
at least one such price p ∈ Pcand happens with probability at most
δ . Taking the complement of the event, we complete the proof. 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. There exists some p0 ∈ Pcand such that p0 < p∗ <
(1+α)p0. Theorem 2 tells us that with high probability, if p0S(p0) >
(1 + α)p0S((1 + α)p0), our choice pm is p0, otherwise it is (1 + α)p0.
So we have the following inequalities:
pmS(pm ) ≥ p0S(p0) ≥ p0S(p∗) ≥ p
∗S(p∗)
1 + α
≥ (1 − α)p∗S(p∗).

B.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. As it is sufficient to prove the ratio for any t , we omit
the superscript t .
We first derive the upper bound of OPT . If we suppose all the
requesters accept the prices, OPT must be smaller than the maxi-
mum weights of the matching. LetM∗ and R∗ denote the matching
and the corresponding set of tasks. We have OPT ≤ ∑r ∈R∗ drp∗д .
For the lower bound of ALG, consider a matching algorithm
which only ensures M∗; that is, if any requester r ∈ R∗ in the
matching rejects the price pb , its neighbor workerw w.r.t.M
∗ will
not serve the other tasks. For each instance of the possible bipartite
graph, since our algorithm achieves the maximum weights, ALG
must be greater than the expected revenue of this algorithm. We
have
ALG ≥
∑
д
∑
r ∈R∗tд
pbS
д(pb )dr
=
∑
д
∑
r ∈R∗tд
∑
д p
д
m
G
Sд(
∑
д p
д
m
G
)dr
≥
∑
д
∑
r ∈R∗tд
dr
∑
д p
д
mS
д(pдm )
G
≥ 1
e
∑
д
∑
r ∈R∗tд
dr
∑
д p
д
m
G
≥ 1
eG
∑
д
∑
r ∈R∗tд
drp
∗д
≥ 1
eG
OPT .
The third inequality is because of the concavity of the function
pSд(p). The fifth one is because we assume Gpmin ≥ pmax . The
fourth one can be derived by the following fact.
Fact 2. Let F be any MHR distribution with support on [0,∞]. Let
pm = argmaxp pS(p). S(pm ) ≥ 1/e . [10]

C PROOFS OF DYNAMIC PRICING
C.1 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. By Hoeffding inequalities, Pr[Ŝ(p) − S(p) > c(p)p ] =
Pr[S(p) − Ŝ(p) > c(p)p ] ≤ e−2c
2(p)N (p)/p2 = N−4. The last equal-
ity is derived by replacing c(p) with p
√
2 lnN
N (p) . 
C.2 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. The first inequality can be derived by Lemma 6. For the
second, we have pŜ(p)+c(p) < pS(p)+2c(p) = pS(p)+2p
√
2 lnN
N (p) <
max(p′S(p′),p′′S(p′′)) − pS(p), where the last inequality can be
obtained by replacing N (p). 
C.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. We discuss three cases showed in Fig. 4.
For the first one where D ≥ C and p0 = 0, from Lemma 7, we
have pŜ(p) + c(p) < max(p′S(p′),p′′S(p′′)) for any p but p′ and p′′.
For any p such that p < p′ ≤ p∗, since Dp/C < Dp′/C < Dp′′/C
and pŜ(p)+ c(p) < max(p′S(p′),p′′S(p′′)), p’s index is smaller than
that of p′ (or p′′) and we cannot choose such p. For any p such that
p > p′′ ≥ p∗, since we havepŜ(p)+c(p) < max(p′S(p′),p′′S(p′′)) <
Dp/C , we know the smaller term of its index is pŜ(p)+c(p), and we
will choose p′ or p′′, since pŜ(p) + c(p) < max(p′S(p′),p′′S(p′′)) ≤
max(p′Ŝ(p′) + c(p′),p′′Ŝ(p′′) + c(p′′)), by Lemma 7.
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Figure 9: Proof of optimality.
For the second one and the third one, if p < p0, Dp/C is the
smaller term of its index due to the first inequality in Lemma 7.
Furthermore, as Dp/C < max(p′S(p′),p′′S(p′′)) ≤ max(p′Ŝ(p′) +
c(p′),p′′Ŝ(p′′) + c(p′′)), p′ or p′′ has larger index. For p0 ≤ p, the
analysis is similar to the first case; we cannot choose p for either
p < p′ or p > p′′. Note that there is no need to discuss p < p′ in
the third case, since p′ < p0 = p∗.

C.4 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. We will use coordinate geometry to give a proof. Some
redefined variables may cause a little abuse of notation, but they
will only be used in this proof.
Every two successive Δд is related to three lines. Without loss of
generality, let k1,k2,k3 denote their slopes. Since we add we add dr
in the decreasing order, we have k2−k1 > k3−k2.. They are showed
with the concave function in Figure 9. The intersections of these
lines and the concave function will be denoted byA,B,C , with their
corresponding function values y1,y2,y3. And note that A,B,C are
all at the right of the maximizer of the concave function. y2 − y1
will be the old Δд and y3−y2 is the new one. It is sufficient to prove
that under the condition that k2 − k1 > k3 − k2, y2 − y1 > y3 − y2
holds.
Claim 1. If k2 − k1 = k3 − k2, then y2 − y1 > y3 − y2.
Suppose this claim is true. We claim that when k2 −k1 > k3 −k2,
y2 − y1 > y3 − y2 holds as well. Indeed, if we reduce k1 by a tiny
small value so that k2 − k1 > k3 − k2, where k2 and k3 are fixed, y1
can only be smaller since Amoves downwards.
Now we will prove by contradiction when supposing y2 − y1 ≤
y3 − y2. Let A and B be fixed. Draw a line through B vertical to
x-coordinate. The line intersects with the line of slope k1 at F and
with the line of slope k3 at E. Through E draw a line parallel to the
line with the slope k1. The line intersects with the extension of line
AB atG . ThroughG draw the line perpendicular to EF , with its foot
denoted by D, and the line intersects with the line of slope k3 at H .
Through A draw the line perpendicular to EF , with its foot denoted
byQ . Let the x value of F be c . BF = c(k2 −k1) and BE = c(k3 −k2).
Since k2 −k1 = k3 −k2, BE = BF . ∠AFB = ∠GEB because EG ‖ AF .
With ∠ABF = ∠GBE, BAF  BGE. If y2 − y1 ≤ y3 − y2, the
y value of C must be between the y value of E and the y value
of D. Because C is on the line of slope k3, C must be on the line
segment EH . The slope of line BC is smaller than that of AB, which
contradicts with the concavity of the curve, soy2−y1 > y3−y2. 
C.5 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. For each feasible plan nt = (nt1,nt2, . . . ,ntG ), it must
correspond to a matching in the bipartite graph. This is because
each worker becomes the supply of some grid д requires that there
is an edge in the graph, and a worker can only be the supply of one
grid. Let us denote the set of tasks which are assigned to workers
by R′t . The ∑д Lд(ntд) can be rethought as the function of R′t ,
rewritten as L(R′t ). The value is calculated by counting ntд and
deriving each ptд for each д.
Lemma 9 tells us that in each grid д, each increase Δд is decreas-
ing. And in each iteration, we use max-heap to find the largest
increase among all grids. In a word, whenever there is a chance
to increase
∑
д L
д(ntд), we always choose the largest currently
possible value.
If we show that L(W ′t ) is a monotone submodular set function,
our algorithm will give us a 1 − 1e approximation by [14]. It is easy
to prove that it is monotone increasing, since one more worker
can only increase the function values. For submodularity, we need
to prove that for any R1 ⊆ R2 ⊆ Rt and r ∈ Rt \R2, L(R1 ∪ {r }) −
L(R1) ≥ L(R2 ∪ {r }) − L(R2). Suppose r is w.r.t. д, since the slope in
L(R1) is smaller than that of L(R2), we know the inequality holds
by the concavity of the curve. 
C.6 Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. We will not consider tasks in Rt that is beyond any
worker’s reachability, because neither ALG nor OPT can complete
these tasks. Given some pt , we first focus on the revenue for each
t . For some д, given price ptд , the total revenueU t is smaller than
min(∑r ∈Rtд drxrptд ,∑ntдi=1 driptд). Let random variables X and Y
denote the two terms. Noticing thatE[min(X ,Y ))] ≤ min(E[X ],E[Y ]),
we have
E[U t |pt ] ≤
∑
д
min(
∑
r ∈Rtд
drp
tдSд(ptд),
ntд∑
i=1
drip
tд)
=
∑
д
L(ntд ,ptд).
On the other hand, given any pt , we want to prove
E[U t |pt ] ≥
∑
д
L(ntд ,ptд) − O(dmax
√
m logm).
For the first term in L, we use the general Chernoff bound [18]:
Fact 3. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be independent Bernoulli random vari-
ables, which is 1 with probability S . Let X =
∑n
i=1 dixi with di > 0.
Define ν =
∑n
i=1 d
2
i S . Pr[E[X ] − X > ϵ] ≤ e
−2ϵ2
2ν .
Taking the inequality for X , we have
U t ≥
∑
д
∑
r ∈Rtд
drp
tдSд(ptд) − O(dmax
√
m logm)
with high probability. For the second term, we first observe that
E[U t |pt ] ≥
∑
д
ntд∑
i=1
drip
tдSд(ptд).
This is because for the ntдth largest dri , they will be definitely
finished if they accept the price. Here we also assume the following
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inequality holds: (1 − Sд(ptд))∑ntдi=1 driptд ≤ O(dmax√ntд logm),
which is often true in practice. Combining these two, we will obtain
the result for the second term.
We know ALG chooses n′t and p′t which achieves at least (1 −
1
e )maxntд,ptд
∑
д L(ntд ,ptд). Let n∗t and p∗t denote the choices
of OPT . We have
ALG ≥
∑
д
L(n′tд ,p′tд) − O(dmax
√
m logm)
≥ (1 − 1/e)
∑
д
L(n∗tд ,p∗tд) − O(dmax
√
m logm)
≥ (1 − 1/e)
∑
д
E[U t |p∗t ] − O(dmax
√
m logm)
= (1 − 1/e)OPT − O(dmax
√
m logm).
Designing L this way gives a good approximation for the ex-
pected revenue. Another approximate expression could be
min( |Rtд |Sд (ptд ),ntд )∑
i=1
drip
tдSд(ptд).
We leave the analysis in future work. 
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Figure 10: Results on varying α of exponential distribution.
D EFFECT OF α OF THE DEMAND
DISTRIBUTION OF vr
Fig. 10 presents the results of varying α of the exponential demand
distributions. As shown in the figures, MAPS still achieves the
largest revenue with reasonable time and memory cost. The results
are similar to those using demand following a normal distribution.
